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Abstract
This chapter examines the financing of unemployment insurance (UI) and its eﬀects
on wage levels and employment when labour markets are unionized and the revenues of
the firms are stochastic. Unemployment benefits are partly financed by the union with
the UI contributions of its employed members and therefore the union runs a UI fund.
First we assume that the fund operates on a pay-as-you-go financing principle and show
that stochasticity causes procyclical employment fluctuations. Then we allow the union to
collect a buﬀer fund to stabilize the cost of unemployment over business cycles. The main
focus of this chapter is on the eﬀects of buﬀer funding on the union’s wage decisions and
thereby on employment. We show that if wages are flexible, buﬀer funding stabilizes the
economy by decreasing employment fluctuations. If wages are rigid, the result holds only if
the UI payment is imposed on employers. When the wages are rigid and the UI payment is
imposed on the employees, buﬀer funding does not directly aﬀect employment fluctuations,
but it can increase the union’s wage demand and thereby decrease employment.
JEL-codes: J32, J51, J58
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1 Introduction
In the standard trade union models, it is usually assumed that the unemployment
benefits the unemployed members receive are provided and financed by the govern-
ment. It is also assumed that the government finances the benefits from its general
tax revenue and that the wage decisions of a single union do not aﬀect the general
tax level. In the standard models, there is thus no link between the union’s wage
decisions and unemployment expenses.
In the so-called Ghent countries the link exists. Several papers by Holmlund and
Lundborg (1988, 1989, 1999) examine how diﬀerent UI financing systems aﬀect union
wage demands and employment. They assume that the unemployment insurance sys-
tem is organized through trade union aﬃliated funds. This system, called the Ghent
system, is practiced in Finland and Sweden, where the funds are also heavily subsi-
dized by the state. Holmlund and Lundborg study the eﬀects of diﬀerent financing
systems in a static monopoly union model. They have modified the union model by
assuming that the union finances part of the benefits of its unemployed members.
They show, for example, that a higher lump-sum state grant to the funds increases
employment, but that a higher marginal subsidy has an ambiguous eﬀect on employ-
ment. Holmlund and Lundborg, and also Holmlund (2001), claim but do not show
that a higher marginal subsidy, that is, a higher experience rating, leads to wage
moderation and thus to higher employment.
We also study the eﬀects of the unemployment insurance financing system on wage
levels and employment in labour markets where the wage is set by a monopoly union.
We assume that the unemployment insurance system is organized by the union. The
union finances unemployment benefits from employees’ UI contributions, for which it
maintains a UI fund. We show, for example, that a higher experience rating almost
always moderates the union’s wage demand. A higher marginal subsidy increases
this wage demand only if the wage elasticity of the labour demand in very low. The
well-known result from labour taxation literature is that in the standard trade union
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models the composition of wage and payroll tax does not aﬀect the wage-bargaining
outcome if the employer and employees have the same tax bases (Koskela and Scho¨b,
1999). We show that when the tax is a decision variable of the union the result does
not necessarily hold.
We are particularly interested in the eﬀect of buﬀer funding on union wage de-
mands and on employment. Buﬀer funding was introduced at Finland in the end of
the 1990s. Following the deep recession earlier in the decade Filnand’s unemployment
financing system was reformed, and buﬀer funding was part of that reform. A buﬀer
is created by collecting UI payments set at a level higher than the current state of the
economy would require. In a recession, part of the benefits can then be paid from the
buﬀer. The upper limit of the buﬀer is an amount that corresponds to expenses of
3.6 per cent unemployment (about 0.5 billion euros). The UI fund can show a deficit
of an equal amount in a recession.
The goal of the new system was to stabilize the unemployment expenses and to
smooth out fluctuations in the cost of labour over business cycles. It is obvious that
buﬀer funding stabilizes labour costs and employment but what it does to union wage
demands is less obvious. Does buﬀer funding have an eﬀect on unions’ wage deci-
sions? When the financing reform and buﬀer funding were designed there was very
little discussion about the possible eﬀects of buﬀer funding on wages and thereby on
employment. Labour market organizations emphasized the stabilizing eﬀects. How-
ever, if buﬀer funding increases a union’s wage demand then this would imply not
only that employment fluctuates less but also that employment fluctuates on a lower
level.
No research exists on the eﬀects of buﬀer funding on wage-bargaining outcomes.
In this study, we examine how it aﬀects the union wage demand in a simple two-period
monopoly union model. In the first period the union can, or must, collect a positive
buﬀer for the UI fund, which it can use in the second period to pay part of the second
period unemployment expenses. First we assume that wages are flexible. It turns out
that buﬀer funding decreases employment and net wage fluctuations when wages are
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flexible. When wages are rigid, buﬀer funding smooths out employment fluctuations
only when the insurance payment is levied on the employer. We also show that when
wages are rigid buﬀer funding can increase the union’s wage demand and the eﬀect is
stronger the worse is the economic state in the second period. We also examine how
buﬀer funding aﬀects the union’s utility. We assume that the union collects the buﬀer
on the government’s order but it turns out that in some cases the buﬀer increases the
union’s total utility.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a static model where
the union finances a part of the unemployment benefits of its unemployed members.
In Section 3 we examine a two-period model and assume that wages are flexible. In
the first period of the model the union has to augment the UI fund a positive buﬀer
that it can use in the second period. In Section 4 we examine the eﬀects of wage
rigidity on the results of Section 3. Section 5 concludes.
2 Benchmark model
Our benchmark model is based on the standard monopoly union model (see, for
example, Oswald 1982) which represents labour markets between one union and one
firm. The model assumes that all workers the firm can employ are unionized and the
union has a monopoly in the labour market, in the sense that it can determine the
wage level. However, the firm has a right to manage: given the wage level set by the
union, it can decide how many workers to employ.
We assume the union has M members, some of whom are employed and some of
whom are unemployed. The employed members are paid wage w, set by the union,
and the unemployed members receive a fixed unemployment benefit b. In the standard
monopoly union model, financing of the unemployment benefits is exogenous when
the underlying assumption usually is that the government finances the benefits with
its general tax revenue and the union’s wage decision does not aﬀect the general tax
level. We modify the standard model by assuming that a share α of the benefits is
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financed by the union and a share 1−α is financed by the government. We can then
interpret the parameter α as the degree of experience rating.
The union finances the benefits by imposing a UI contribution on its employed
members and consequently maintains UI fund. Employees contribute share τ of their
gross wage to the fund and the union pays the benefits of its unemployed members.
When L denotes employment, the income of the fund equals τwL and the expenditure
α(M − L)b. When the fund operates on a pay-as-you-go principle the union adjusts
the level of the contribution such that every period the income equals the expenditure.
Later we allow the union to save contributions, in which case the UI fund can have a
positive buﬀer.
In this study, we assume that the UI contribution is imposed only on employees
because it makes the derivation of the results slightly easier. The assumption is also
justified in the case of a monopoly union . If we had assumed wage bargaining between
the union and the firm, the contribution could be also imposed on the employer and
an object of bargaining.
We keep the assumptions that the government finances its share of the unemploy-
ment expenses with its general tax revenue and that the union’s wage decision does
not aﬀect the general tax level, but change the standard model by adding uncertainty
to it. We assume that the firm’s revenues are subject to a demand or a technological
shock θ. The course of events in the benchmark model is the following: the shock
occurs and both the union and the firm observe the shock; the union sets the wage
and the UI contribution; the firm decides employment given w and τ .
2.1 The equilibrium
We solve the modified monopoly union model by backwards induction and start from
the firm’s problem. Given the wage decision of the union, the firm chooses employment
such that the choice maximizes profits. When we normalize the price level to one and
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assume fixed capital the firm’s profit is then given by
π = θf(L)− wL, (1)
where f(·) denotes an increasing and concave production function and θ a technolog-
ical shock. We assume a Cobb Douglas production function
f(L) =
L
ξ
ξ
, (2)
where 0 < ξ < 1. We examine neither the case where the shock the economy faces
drives the firm into bankruptcy nor the case where there is excess demand of labour
in the economy. Therefore the shock θ ∈ [θ, θ], such that θ, θ > 0, θ < θ, and π ≥ 0
and L ≤M with all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. We can now write the firm’s profit function as
π = θL
ξ
ξ
− wL. (3)
From the firm’s maximization problem, maxL π, we can solve the labour demand
function
L = L(w) =
Ã
θ
w
! 1
1−ξ
. (4)
In the case of a Cobb Douglas production function the wage elasticity of labour
demand is constant and given by η = 1
1−ξ > 1. We can write the labour demand
function in the elasticity form when
L(w) =
Ã
θ
w
!η
. (5)
The union hasM homogenous, risk-averse members. We assume that the objective
function of the monopoly union is
V (w, τ , L) = L [u( bw)− u(b)] , (6)
where u(·) is an increasing and concave utility function of a union member and bw =
w(1− τ) the net wage. Two constraints restrict the union’s wage and UI contribution
decisions: the labour demand function (5) and the budget constraint
τwL− α(M − L)b = 0. (7)
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From the budget constraint (7) we can solve the UI contribution τ = τ(w) and show
that τ 0 > 0; the contribution increases when the union raises its wage demand.
The union’s maximization problem can now be written as
max
w,τ
V (w, τ , L) (8)
subject to
L = L(w) (9)
τ = τ (w). (10)
When we substitute (9) and (10) for L and τ in the objective function we can write
the first-order condition of the maximization problem as
L0(w) [u( bw)− u(b)] + L(w)u0( bw) bww = 0. (11)
At the optimum, the union equates the marginal gain from a wage increase with
the marginal loss. The first term in equation (11) is the marginal loss: a change in
employment multiplied by the utility loss when moving from the set of employed to
the set of unemployed. The second term is the marginal gain: an increase in the
utility of the employed multiplied by employment multiplied by the change in the net
wage.
We can write (11) in the form
η
"
1− u(b)
u( bw)
#
=
u0( bw) bw
u( bw) γ(w), (12)
where η = −L0(w)w
L(w)
is the wage elasticity of the labour demand and γ(w) = bwwwbw is the
gross wage elasticity of the net wage. When τ is fixed, γ(w) = 1. Now the elasticity
γ(w) < 1 because a rise in the gross wage increases unemployment and thereby the
UI contribution rises also, which decreases the net wage. If we assume that the union
members have a CRRA utility function u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ we can write the union’s pricing
equation as
bw = w(1− τ ) = "1 + γ(w)(ρ− 1)
η
# 1
ρ−1
b. (13)
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We must leave the solution in implicit form, because, on the assumptions made, we
cannot solve the union’s wage demand in closed form.
2.2 Properties of the equilibrium
If we assume in the standard model that the firm has a Cobb Douglas production
function we get the following pricing equation:
w =
"
1 +
(ρ− 1)
η
# 1
ρ−1
b. (14)
When we compare the pricing equation (14) to equation (13) we notice that the
union’s participation in the financing of the unemployment benefits decreases the net
wage of its employed members. It is easy to show that when the wage elasticity of
the labour demand is not too high the gross wage decreases also.2 Let us denote the
employment and unemployment rates by e and u, that is, e = L
M
and u = M−L
M
. We
can show the following:
Proposition 1 If the wage elasticity of the labour demand η > ργ u
e
then the optimal
wage demand of the union, w∗, decreases when the union’s share of the unemployment
expenses, α, increases.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Parameter γ(w) < 1 and in realistic cases also u
e
< 1. Therefore the proposition
surely holds if ρ < 1 but can also hold when ρ > 1.
A well-known result of labour taxation theory says that in the standard trade union
models the composition of wage and payroll tax does not aﬀect the wage-bargaining
outcome if the employer and employees have the same tax bases (Koskela and Scho¨b,
1999). It turns out that when the tax, or the UI contribution, is the union’s decision
variable the result does not necessarily hold. The eﬀect of the tax then depends on
2Note that the set-up here slightly diﬀers from the set-up in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 we assumed
that UI contributions are exogenous and a non-proportional insurance premium is endogenous.
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how the employees’ net wage and the employer’s labour cost react to changes in the
gross wage.
In Appendix B we derive the union’s pricing equation when the UI payment is
imposed on the firm. Then bw = w and γ(w) = 1 and the pricing equation becomes
w =
"
1 +
(ρ− 1)
ηκ
# 1
ρ−1
b, (15)
where κ = www
w
> 1 is the gross wage elasticity of the labour cost w = w(1 + τ). The
elasticity κ is higher than one because an increase in the gross wage raises the firm’s
UI contribution which implies that the labour cost increases by more than the full
amount of the wage increase.
When we compare equation (13) to equation (15) we notice that, with same UI
contribution level, the net wage is higher (lower) when the UI contribution is imposed
on the employees than when on the employer, if γ(w)κ > 1 (γ(w)κ < 1). When
γ(w)κ = 1 the net wages are equal in both cases. Let us suppose, for example, that
γ(w) = 0.8 when a five per cent increase in the gross wage causes only a four per cent
rise in the net wage. Both models lead to same net wage if κ = 1.25. If the gross
wage elasticity is larger (smaller) than 1.25, the net wage is higher (lower) when the
UI contribution is imposed on the employees than when on the employer.
When the UI contribution is imposed on employees the labour cost is
w =
h
1 + γ(w)(ρ−1)η
i 1
ρ−1 b
(1−τ) , and when it is imposed on the employer w(1 + τ ) =h
1 + (ρ−1)ηκ
i 1
ρ−1 b(1 + τ). It is easy to see that if γ(w)κ ≥ 1 the labour cost is higher
and employment lower when the UI contribution is from the employees than when it
is from the employer (again with same contribution level). If γ(w)κ < 1 the labour
cost can be higher, equal or lower and employment lower, equal or higher when the
UI contribution is from employees than when it is from the employer. We combine
the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When the gross wage elasticity of the net wage (γ(w)) is larger than
the inverse of the gross wage elasticity of the labour cost ( 1κ), the net wage and labour
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cost are higher when the UI contribution is imposed on employees than when it is
imposed on the firm. When they are equal, the net wages are equal in both cases but
the labour cost is higher when the UI contribution is imposed on the employees than
when on the employer. When γ(w) < 1κ the net wage is lower but labour cost can be
higher, equal or lower when the UI contribution is imposed on employees than when
it is imposed on the firm.
Finally we prove a result we will need in the next section. The result states that
the union decreases its wage demand when the state of the economy improves. The
result is not very intuitive. In the trade union models where the financing of the
unemployment benefits is exogenous, an improvement in the economic state leads to
a rise in wages. In our model the union also must take into account the eﬀect an
improvement has on the UI contribution. During a boom the firm demands more
labour and employment rises. A fall in unemployment leads to a decrease in the UI
contribution which gives room to wage moderation.
Proposition 3 The optimal wage demand of the union, w∗, decreases when θ in-
creases.
Proof. In Appendix C.
3 Two-period model with flexible wages
This chapter focuses on unemployment insurance buﬀer funding and on its influence
on the union’s wage decisions and consequently on employment. By buﬀer funding,
we mean that the union saves part of the income of its UI fund and uses it for future
unemployment expenses. We examine the eﬀects of buﬀer funding in the simplest
possible dynamic environment: a two-period model. We therefore assume that the
modified monopoly union game we presented in the previous section is played twice.
First we assume the fund operates on the pay-as-you-go principle where the union
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adjusts its UI contribution according to the economic state. It turns out that employ-
ment then fluctuates procyclically. Then we change the financing principle, assuming
that in the first period the union must collect a positive buﬀer for the UI fund, and
examine the eﬀect of this on employment fluctuations. Our basic assumption is that
to stabilize the economy the government orders the union to collect the buﬀer and
decides what size the buﬀer should be. In section 3.2, however, we also study under
what circumstances the buﬀer increases the total utility of the union.
The course of events in both periods is now the same as in the one-period model.
That is, in both periods, first the shock occurs and both the union and the firm
observe the shock. The union sets its wage demand and the UI contribution, and
then the firm decides employment. In other words, here we assume that the union
can react to the shock by changing both its wage demand and the UI contribution. In
Section 4 we examine the eﬀects of wage rigidity when the union has to fix its wage
demand at the beginning of period one and cannot change it after the realization of
the second period shock.
3.1 The equilibrium
Let us first assume that the UI fund operates on the pay-as-you-go principle. We
denote the wage, the UI contribution, employment, and the value of the shock in
period i by wi, τ i, Li, and θi, i = 1, 2. For simplicity we assume that the shock can
take only two values. The shock can either be “good”, when θi = θg, or “bad”, when
θi = θb, θg > θb. The probability of a good shock is known by both the union and
the firm and P (θi = θg) = ψ when P (θi = θb) = 1− ψ.
From the firm’s period i maximization problem we now get the labour demand in
period i
Li(wi) =
Ã
θi
wi
!η
, i = 1, 2. (16)
The pay-as-you-go principle implies that the period i budget constraint of the union
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is
τ iwiLi − α(M − Li)b = 0, i = 1, 2. (17)
The union’s two-period maximization problem is now
max
(w1,w2,τ1,τ2)
L1 [u( bw1)− u(b)] + βL2 [u( bw2)− u(b)] (18)
subject to
Li = Li(wi), i = 1, 2 (19)
τ iwiLi − α(M − Li)b = 0, i = 1, 2, (20)
where β = 1
1+rd
is the union’s discount factor and rd the discount rate.
In the case of pay-as-you-go financing the only diﬀerence between the periods is
the possible change in the value of the shock. We assumed that the shock occurs
before the union gives its wage demand which implies that in both periods the union
can react to the shock with its wage and contribution decisions. Clearly, if the value
of the shock does not change between the periods neither does the union’s wage
demand nor the firm’s employment decision. If the value of the shock changes, based
on Proposition 3, we can conclude that if the economy is worse (better) in the first
period than in the second period then the union demands a higher (lower) wage in
the first period than in the second period.
Next we assume that in the first period the union saves a part of the UI contri-
butions, that is, it collects a buﬀer a, a > 0, for its UI fund. In the second period
the union can then cover some of the unemployment expenses with the buﬀer and its
interest income. We do not consider private saving because our focus is on the im-
plications of buﬀer funding for the union’s wage decisions. We therefore assume that
the union has easier access to credit markets than its members have. Including pri-
vate saving would complicate the model considerably. It is diﬃcult to include private
saving in the standard trade union models because in both periods of a two-period
model it is completely random which of the members are employed and which are
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unemployed, for example.3
In the case of buﬀer funding the union maximizes (18) subject to the first and sec-
ond period labour demand constraints (19) and the following two budget constraints:
τ1w1L1 − α(M − L1)b− a = 0, (21)
τ2w2L2 − α(M − L2)b+ (1 + r)a = 0, (22)
where r denotes the interest rate. Let w∗1 and w
∗
2, and L
∗
1 and L
∗
2 denote the optimal
first and second period wage demand and employment. In the two-period model
economy can be in four possible states. We can show that if the economic state
does not change, the union’s wage demand increases in the period when it collects
the buﬀer and decreases in the period when it uses the buﬀer. That is, in a non-
stochastic world the wages are higher and employment is lower in the period the
buﬀer is collected than in the period it is used. Buﬀer funding then causes wage and
employment fluctuations.
Proposition 4 Let θ be fixed. Then the union demands a higher wage in the period
it collects the buﬀer fund than in the period it uses it, that is, if θ1 = θ2 then w∗1 > w∗2
which implies that L∗1 < L
∗
2.
Proof. In Appendix D.
In the most unrealistic situation the economy is in recession in the first period
when the buﬀer is formed and is in a boom in the second period when the buﬀer is
used. When the fund operates on the pay-as-you-go principle ( a = 0 ) the union
demands a higher wage during a recession than during a boom in the second period
3Private saving and unemployment insurance is examined in an interesting paper by Hassler
and Mora (1999). Hassler and Mora begin with an observation that unemployment benefits are
higher and turnover between unemployment and employment is lower in Europe than in the U.S..
They explain that when turnover is high, saving and borrowing can replace unemployment insurance
but when turnover is low, that is, when unemployment is more persistent, generous unemployment
benefits become more valuable and the political system more easily supports them.
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(Proposition 3). Employment is aﬀected by both the union’s wage demand and the
shock. Due to the influence of the shock, labour demand and thereby employment is
lower during a recession than during a boom, and changes in the union’s wage demand
increase the diﬀerence between the first and second period employment. When a > 0
the union increases the first period and decreases the second period wage demand.
Hence the buﬀer in this case further increases fluctuations in the union’s wage demand
and thereby in employment.
Let us next assume the state of the economy is good when the buﬀer is collected
and bad when it is used. This case represents the situation the buﬀer is built for: it is
collected during a boom to cover part of increased unemployment expenses during a
recession. When the fund operates on the pay-as-you-go principle ( a = 0 ) the union
demands a higher wage during a recession than during a boom and the variations in
the union’s wage demand increase employment fluctuations. When a > 0 the union
increases its first and decreases its second period wage demand. Wages then fluctuate
less, which levels out employment fluctuations. Buﬀer funding in this case stabilizes
the economy.
Figure 1 shows how the buﬀer fund and the size of the second period shock aﬀect
diﬀerences in the first and second period gross and net wage, and employment. The
figure is drawn such that when the value of the second period shock is two there is
no uncertainty, θ1 = θ2. In Figure 1 (a) we can see that the larger the buﬀer fund
collected in the first period is, the more the gross wage varies between the periods.
On the other hand, a larger buﬀer decreases fluctuations in the net wage and in
employment, as shown in Figure 1 (b) and 1 (c). In Figure 1 (c) we have also drawn
the plane where employment fluctuations are zero. From the intersectional line of the
two planes we get the size of the buﬀer that completely levels out the fluctuations
in employment. Figure 1 (c) shows that the lower the value is of the second period
shock, the larger must be the buﬀer to level out employment fluctuations.
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Figure 1: The relationship between the value of the second period shock, θ2, the size
of the buﬀer, a, and the diﬀerence between the first and the second period (a) optimal
gross wage, (b) optimal net wage, and (c) employment. (Parameter values: α = 0.4,
b=1, M=1, ρ = 0.9, η = 1.1, r=0.05.)
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3.2 The union’s utility
We assumed that the union collects the buﬀer at the government’s demand. Would
the union do it voluntarily in some cases? In other words, is it possible that in some
circumstances the union could benefit from a buﬀer? Labour demand and thereby
unemployment expenses are stochastic and the union in our model cannot insure itself
against labour demand variation. Therefore, in some cases it could benefit the union
to use the buﬀer for self-insurance.
Next we study under what conditions a positive buﬀer increases the total utility of
the union. Let V now denote the maximum value function of the two-period model.
By the envelope theorem
Va = (V1)a + β(V2)a (23)
= −L1u( bw1)( bw1)a − βL2u0( bw2)( bw2)a (24)
= −u0( bw1) + β(1 + r)u0( bw2). (25)
We want to know under on what conditions Va > 0. The inequality Va > 0 holds if
−u0( bw1) + β(1 + r)u0( bw2) > 0. (26)
We can write (26) in the form
u0( bw1)
βu0( bw2) < 1 + r. (27)
Equation (27) states that the buﬀer increases the total utility of the union if the
marginal rate of substitution between net wage in two periods is smaller than the
interest factor.4 With a CRRA utility function the inequality (27) becomes
bw2bw1 >
µ
1 + r
1 + rd
¶1/ρ
. (28)
Let us assume that the economy is in a boom in the first period when the buﬀer
is collected and in a recession in the second period when the buﬀer is used. In Figure
4Note that result and equation (27) are closely connected with union employed members’ optimal
intertemporal allocation of consumption (see, for example, Deaton 1992).
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Figure 2: The relationship between the value of the interest rate, r, the size of the
buﬀer, a, and the derivative of the value function with respect to the buﬀer, Va, when
wages are flexible. (Parameter values: α = 0.4, b=1, M=1, ρ = 0.9, η = 1.1,
rd=0.05.)
2 we have drawn Va with diﬀerent values of the interest rate r and the buﬀer a. We
have also drawn in figure a plane where Va = 0. We can see that the larger the buﬀer
is, the higher is the interes rate required to increase the utility of the union.
4 Two-period model with rigid wages
In the previous section we assumed that the union was able to react to the shocks the
economy faces by changing its wage demand. We derived the result that the union
increases its wage demand in the period it collects the buﬀer and decreases it in the
period it uses the buﬀer. In practice, due to the labour market agreements, nominal
wages adjust more slowly than employment to a new economic situation. Next we
examine how wage rigidity aﬀects the results of the previous section. Therefore we
assume that at the beginning of the two-period game the union sets the wage for
both periods. The union makes its wage decision after the first period shock has
been realized and cannot change it during the second period. Following the wage
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decision, the union sets the first period UI contribution and the firm chooses the
first period employment. Then the second period shock occurs, the union sets the
second period UI contribution and the firm chooses the second period employment.
We keep the assumptions that the union finances the unemployment benefits with
the UI contributions of its employed members and that in the first period the union
collects a buﬀer a and in the second period uses it.
4.1 The equilibrium
When the wage is the same in both periods the only factor that changes the firm’s
employment decision is the value of the shock. The labour demand function in period
i is now
Li(w) =
Ã
θi
w
!η
, i = 1, 2. (29)
The union chooses its wage demand for the two periods, in a situation where it knows
the first period economic state but is uncertain about that of the second period. The
union then maximizes its expected utility
EV = V1 + βEV2 = (30)
V1 + β (ψVg + (1− ψ)Vb) ,
where Vg and Vb denote union’s utility when the second period state of the economy
is good and when it is bad. The union’s maximization problem now is
max
w,τ1,τ
g
2,τ
b
2
V1 + β (ψVg + (1− ψ)Vb) (31)
subject to
L1 =
Ã
θ1
w
!η
(32)
Lg =
Ã
θg
w
!η
(33)
Lb =
Ã
θb
w
!η
(34)
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τ 1 =
α(M − L1)b+ a
wL1
, (35)
τ g =
α(M − Lg)b− (1 + r)a
wLg2
, (36)
τ b =
α(M − Lb)b− (1 + r)a
wLb
, (37)
where τ1, τ g, and τ b denote the first period, the second period good state, and the
second period bad state UI contribution. The first-order condition is now
L01(w) (u( bw1)− u(b)) + L1(w)u0( bw1) bw01 + (38)
βψ
h
L0g(w) (u( bwg)− u(b)) + Lg(w)u0( bwg) bw0gi+
β(1− ψ) [L0b(w) (u( bwb)− u(b)) + Lb(w)u0( bwb) bw0b]
= 0.
Equation (38) can be written as
L1(w)u( bw1)
"
L01(w)w
L1(w)
Ã
1− u(b)
u( bw1)
!
+
u0( bw1) bw1
u( bw1)
bw01wbw1
#
+ (39)
βψLg(w)u( bwg)
"
L0g(w)w
Lg(w)
Ã
1− u(b)
u( bwg)
!
+
u0( bwg) bwg
u( bwg)
bw0gwbwg
#
+
β(1− ψ)Lb(w)u( bwb)
"
L0b(w)w
Lb(w)
Ã
1− u(b)
u( bwb)
!
+
u0( bwb) bwb
u( bwb)
bw0bwbwb
#
= 0
which can be further simplified to
θη1(1− τ 1)1−ρ

−η

1−
Ã
bbw1
!1−ρ
+ (1− ρ)γ1

+ (40)
βψθηg(1− τ g)1−ρ

−η

1−
Ã
bbwg
!1−ρ
+ (1− ρ)γg

+
β(1− ψ)θηb (1− τ b)1−ρ

−η

1−
Ã
bbwb
!1−ρ
+ (1− ρ)γb


= 0.
From equation (40) we get a pricing equation that resembles the pricing equation
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(14) we solved from the one-period model. We get
w =
"
p
z
+
x(ρ− 1)
zη
# 1
ρ−1
b, (41)
where the terms
p = θη1(1− τ1)1−ρ + β
³
ψθηg(1− τ g)1−ρ + (1− ψ)θ
η
b (1− τ b)1−ρ
´
, (42)
x = θη1(1− τ1)1−ργ1 + β
³
ψθηg(1− τ g)1−ργg + (1− ψ)θ
η
b (1− τ b)1−ργb
´
, (43)
z = θη1 + β
³
ψθηg + (1− ψ)θ
η
b
´
. (44)
Note that if the value of the shock θ is the same in both periods and there is no
buﬀer τ1 = τ g = τ b = τ and γ1 = γg = γb = γ. Then the pricing equa-
tion (41) becomes the same we obtained from the one-period model, that is, w =h
(1− τ)1−ρ + (1−τ)1−ργ(ρ−1)η
i 1
ρ−1 b.
Two things now aﬀect the union’s wage demand: uncertainty and the buﬀer.
Let us first suppose that there is no buﬀer, that is, a = 0 and θ1 = θg > θb. If
the realization of the second period shock is bad, the union then must increase the
UI contribution that put a wage raise pressure on the union’s wage decision at the
beginning of the first period. This wage pressure increases the fixed wage. A positive
buﬀer, a > 0, has two eﬀects: the union must increase the first period UI contribution
but can decrease the second period contributions. A rise in τ 1 causes wage raise
pressure and a fall in τ g and τ b wage cut pressure. A fall in τ b also reduces the wage
raise pressure caused by the second period bad shock. The first period eﬀect can
dominate the second period eﬀect, as depicted in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows how the
size of the buﬀer and the value of the second period bad shock aﬀect the gross and net
wage. In both of the figures we have assumed that the state of the economy is good
in the first period when the buﬀer is formed. The probability that the shock is good
in the second period is fixed but the value of the bad shock changes. Then a decrease
in the value of the second period bad shock implies an increase in uncertainty. When
θb = 2 there is no uncertainty; the value of the shock is the same in both periods and
in both economic states.
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Figure 3: The relationship between the value of the second period bad shock, the size
of the buﬀer, a, and (a) the optimal gross wage, and (b) the first and second period
optimal net wage. (Parameter values: b=1, m=1, ρ = 0.9, η = 1.1, r=0.05.)
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In Figure 3 (a) we see that when a = 0 and uncertainty increases, that is, when
the value of the second period bad shock decreases, the union raises the wage demand
it gives at the beginning of the first period. We can also see that when there is
no uncertainty the union raises its wage demand with the the size of the buﬀer.
Uncertainty and buﬀer funding together make the union wage demand higher the
worse the second period bad shock is and the larger the buﬀer is. In Figure 3 (b)
the descending plane represents the first period net wage and the ascending plane
the second period net wage. Figure shows that, given the value of the second period
bad shock, the diﬀerence in net wages increases when the size of the buﬀer rises; the
buﬀer in this case increases fluctuations in the net wage. Figure 3 (b) also shows that
the lower the value is of a bad shock, the larger must be the buﬀer to damp down
fluctuations in the net wage. When the wage is rigid and the unemployment insurance
payment is imposed on the employees the buﬀer does not aﬀect the fluctuations in
employment. We have seen that the buﬀer can increase the gross wage and thereby
decrease employment but it has no eﬀect on the diﬀerences between the first and
second period employment.
4.2 The union’s utility
Next we examine how a positive buﬀer aﬀects the union’s utility when the wage is rigid
and the insurance payment is levied on the employees. Let V denote the maximum
value function of the two-period model. Now we can write Va in the following form:
Va = (V1)a + βE(V2)a (45)
= −L1u0( bw1)( bw1)a (46)
−β (ψL2u0( bwg)( bwg)a + (1− ψ)L2u0( bwb))(wb)a)
= −u0( bw1) + β(1 + r) (ψu0( bwg) + (1− ψ)u0( bwb)) , (47)
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Figure 4: The relationship between the value of the interest rate, r, the size of the
buﬀer, a, and the derivative of the value function with respect to the buﬀer, Va, when
wages are rigid. (Parameter values: b=1, m=1, ρ = 0.9, η = 1.1, rd=0.05.)
where we again used the envelope theorem. We try to find out on what conditions
Va > 0. The inequality holds if
1 + r
1 + rd
(ψu0( bwg) + (1− ψ)u0( bwb)) > u0( bw1), (48)
where rd denotes the union members’ discount rate. We can also write (48) in the
form
u0( bw1)
βEu0( bw2) < 1 + r. (49)
The buﬀer now increases the total utility of the union if the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between net wage in the first period and expected net wage in the second
period is smaller than the interest factor.
In Figure 4 we have again drawn Va and the plane where Va = 0. Let us first assume
that τ 1 > τ b > τ g. Then bw1 < bwb < bwg which implies that u0( bw1) > u0( bwb) > u0( bwg).
Then the inequality (49) can only hold if rd << r. The buﬀer can increase the total
utility of the union if the union’s discount rate is very small. When rd ≥ r the
total eﬀect of the buﬀer is always negative for the union. Let us next assume that
τ b ≥ τ1 > τ g when the net wage is higher or equal in the first period compared with the
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second period. The inequality bwb ≤ bw1 < bwg implies that u0( bwb) ≥ u0( bw1) > u0( bwg).
Then the inequality (48) can also hold with higher values of the discount rate rd, that
is, with lower values of the discount factor β. Then it is possible that the inequality
(48) can hold even when rd ≥ r.
We have drawn Figure 4 with the same parameter values we used in Figure 2. The
only diﬀerence is in the values of the second period shock. In Figure 4 the expected
value of the second period shock equals the value of the second period shock we used
in Figure 2. When we compare figures (2) and (4) we can see that wage rigidity
decreases union’s opportunities to benefit from the buﬀer.
5 Conclusions and future research
We have examined buﬀer funding of unemployment insurance in a modified monopoly
union framework assuming that the union finances a part of the unemployment bene-
fits of its unemployed members. The union finances the benefits with UI contributions
it imposed on employees and invests the contributions in the UI fund it maintains.
The chapter has focused on the implications of buﬀer funding with respect to wage
levels and employment.
When buﬀer funding was proposed in Finland, it was argued that it would smooth
out labour cost variation and thereby stabilize employment. Our study shows that
this statement holds true when wages are flexible. However, when wages are rigid
and the UI contribution is imposed on employees, the buﬀer can increase the union’s
wage demand and thereby aﬀect the employment level but it has no direct eﬀect
on employment fluctuations. The worse the economic state is, which the union is
prepared for with buﬀer funding, the stronger the levelling eﬀect becomes.
This study is our first attempt to examine the implications of buﬀer funding and
the model we have used has the usual shortcomings of two-period models. Therefore
our next goal is to examine buﬀer funding in a truly dynamic environment, where we
can also allow for, for example, the union’s borrowing, that is, a negative buﬀer, and
25
correlated shocks.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The maximization problem of the union is
max
w,τ
V = L (u(w(1− τ ))− u(b)) (50)
subject to
L = L(w) (51)
τ = τ (w) = α(M − L)b
wL
. (52)
To prove that the union’s participation in the financing of the UI benefits decreases
its wage demand we show that the optimal w decreases when α, the union’s share of
the unemployment expenses, increases.
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In the proofs we use Topkis’ theory of monotone comparative static (see Topkis
1978, 1998). The objective function of the union, V , is continuous and diﬀerentiable.
Let us denote a parameter by x. According to Topkis’ monotonicity theorem, if we
can prove, for example that Vwx < 0, we can conclude that when x increases then
optimal w decreases. Now
Vα = L(w)u
0( bw) bwα = −u0( bw)(M − L(w))b (53)
and
Vαw = −u00( bw) bww(M − L(w))b+ u0( bw)L0(w)b (54)
We denote the wage elasticity of the labour demand by η = −L0(w)w
L(w)
, the elasticity of
the net wage with respect to the gross wage by γ = bwwwbw and the ratio of unemployment
to employment by ε = M−L(w)
L(w)
. When the union members have a CRRA utility
function u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ the measure of the relative risk aversion is ρ = −
u00(bw)bw
u0(bw) . The
condition Vwα < 0 now holds if
−bu
0( bw)L(w)
w
(η − ργε) < 0. (55)
The first term is negative, therefore the inequality holds if
η − ργε > 0⇒ (56)
η > ργε. (57)
With realistic parameter values the left side of the condition, ργε, is less than one
and the condition holds.
B Proof of Proposition 2
When the UI payment is imposed on the employer the firm’s profit is
π = θf(L)− wL, (58)
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where w = w(1+ τ ) denotes the labour cost. From the firm’s maximization problem,
maxL π, we can solve the labour demand function
L(w) =
Ã
θ
w
!η
. (59)
The union’s objective function is
V (w, τ , L) = L [u(w)− u(b)] (60)
and the budget constraint is
τwL− α(M − L)b = 0. (61)
From the budget constraint we can again solve the UI contribution τ = τ (w) and
show that τ 0 > 0.
The union’s maximization problem is now
max
w,τ
V (w, τ , L) (62)
subject to
L = L(w)
τ = τ (w).
The first-order condition of the maximization problem is now
L0(w)ww [u(w)− u(b)] + L(w)u0(w) = 0. (63)
We can write
ηκ
"
1− u(b)
u(w)
#
+ (1− ρ) = 0,
where L
0(w)w
L(w)
= η is the labour cost elasticity of the labour demand and www
w
= κ > 1
the gross wage elasticity of the labour cost. The union’s pricing equation now becomes
w =
"
1 +
(ρ− 1)
ηκ
# 1
ρ−1
b.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
The maximization problem of the union is
max
w,τ
V = L (u(w(1− τ ))− u(b)) (64)
subject to
L = L(w) (65)
τ = τ (w) = α(M − L)b
wL
. (66)
We must show that the optimal w decreases when the value of θ, the technological
shock, increases.
Now
Vθ = Lθ (u( bw)− u(b)) + Lu0( bw) bwθ = ηθ [L(w) (u( bw)− u(b)) + αMbu0( bw)] (67)
and
Vθw =
η
θ
αMbu00( bw) bww < 0. (68)
D Proof of Proposition 4
First we notice than the maximization problem of the union consists of two optimiza-
tion problems: the first period problem and the second period problem. The only
diﬀerence between the periods is in the budget constraints. In the first period the
union collects a positive buﬀer a. Compared with the one-period model, the fund
increases from 0 to positive a. In the second period the buﬀer is used, that is, the
union “collects a negative fund” a. First we show that a positive buﬀer increases the
union’s first period wage demand. We must show that (V1)wa > 0 where V1 is the
union’s first period utility function. First we solve
(V1)a = −L(w)u0( bw) bwa = −u0( bw).
Then
(V1)wa = −u00( bw) bww > 0.
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If we want to show that a positive buﬀer decreases the union’s second period wage
demand, we must show that in the second period problem (V2)wa < 0. We get
(1 + r)u00( bw) bww < 0. (69)
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